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Abstract
Excess returns for Scandinavian IPO-firm initial buy recommenda-
tions registered on the First Call database from underwriter analysts (in-
formed analysts) for 1996-2002 were compared to those of non-underwriter
analysts (uninformed analysts). Underwriter analysts recommendations
outperformed non-underwriter analyst recommendations during the first
year after publication, yielding 28 percent higher mean excess returns.
Supporting the superior-information hypothesis and contradict earlier re-
search, the result may be explained by two factors: (1) a lower regional
competition between banks for winning corporate finance deals in Scan-
dinavia than the regional competition between banks in the U.S.; and (2)
an extended analyst coverage of IPO firms today than during earlier pe-
riods making it costlier for underwriter analysts to be caught with giving
positively biased buy recommendations.
Key words: Initial public offerings; Quiet period; Stock recommendations;
Underwriter analysts.
JEL Classifications: G14; G15; G18; G24.
∗The author gratefully acknowledges comments on this paper from Thomas Andre´n, Brad
Barber, Eva Liljeblom, Roni Michaely, Carl Montalvo, Carl-Johan Pousette, Jay Ritter, Clas
Wihlborg, four anonymous referees, and the participants at the 2004 Swedish Network for
European Studies in Economics and Business (SNEE) conference in Mo¨lle, as well as the
financial support received from Bankforskningsinstitutet. The usual disclaimer applies.
†Formerly affiliated at Go¨teborg University, School of Economics and Commercial Law,
Dept. of Economics. All correspondence to: erikragnar@hotmail.com.
1
1 Introduction
A firm going public via an initial public offering (IPO) often receives a first
favorable recommendation by its underwriters. Depending on the outcome of
such recommendations, three possible explanations have been hypothesized: (1)
there might be incentives for underwriters to give positively biased recommen-
dations of the firms they underwrite, the ’conflict of interest’ hypothesis; or (2)
positively biased recommendations may be caused by the IPO firm’s choice of
underwriter, the ’selection bias’ hypothesis; or (3) underwriter recommendations
could result from the superior information they gather during the due-diligence
process, the ’superior-information’ hypothesis.1 Hypotheses (1) and (2) apply if
underwriter recommendations perform worse than non-underwriter recommen-
dations during the post-recommendation period. The main objective of this
paper is to address whether buy recommendations are a result of underwriter-
analyst bias or their possession of superior information. Therefore, on the basis
of recent Scandinavian data, we will test whether buy recommendations from
underwriter analysts will, on average, outperform those from non-underwriter
analysts.
Buy recommendations on IPO-firm stocks published closely after the IPO
date have been studied before. Michaely andWomack (1999) (henceforth M&W)
studied the initiated and revised buy recommendations on the 391 IPOs for the
period 1990-91 on the U.S. stock markets. Approximately half of them received
a recommendation of any type within one year of the IPO date, but only 148
received a buy recommendation. M&W found lead-manager analyst buy recom-
mendations to perform more poorly than non-lead manager recommendations
prior to, at the time of, and during the first year after the recommendation
date.2 They see their strong results as evidence that lead-manager analysts
are positively biased and that this potential conflict of interest comes from the
’different functions that investment bankers perform’.
Other evidence have been found in numerous studies that, taken together,
claim that there is no difference in the immediate and long-run stock-price
reaction between underwriter- and non-underwriter recommendations.3
Lately, the competition for corporate-finance deals in the investment-banking
community has hardened (e.g. Ellis et al. (2004)). In order to increase the prob-
ability of winning future corporate finance deals underwriters, therefore, tend to
be overoptimistic4 about the firms’ future prospects. Overly optimistic analysts
are more often evident when underwriters are unlikely to win a deal, and less
likely when they are highly likely to win (see Ljungqvist et al. (2003)).
Although empirical research has found overwhelming support for analyst
over optimism, such research has mainly been based on U.S. data and almost
exclusively for earlier periods.5 Thus, there is no indication whether these phe-
1Related to hypothesis (3) is the ”certification” hypothesis suggesting that the underwriter
has reputational incentives to issue accurate valuations of the firm.
2There are often several underwriters in the syndicate handling an IPO, including lead
managers and co-managers, though the roles of these vary.
3Such evidence has been found in Branson et al. (1998); Lin and McNichols (1998); Bradley
et al. (2003) and Bradley et al. (2006).
4Such results have been found in Bradshaw et al. (2003); Dechow et al. (2000); Dugar and
Nathan (1995); Hong and Kubik (2003) Lin and McNichols (1998); Michaely and Womack
(1999); and Rajan and Servaes (1997).
5A rare exception where more recent data has been analyzed is Bradley et al. (2006).
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nomenon hold on international stock markets and for more recent periods as
well.
What we try do in this paper is to test whether underwriter analysts have
superior information and if this is reflected in their buy recommendations. Us-
ing recent non-US data, we perform this test by analyzing if initial buy rec-
ommendations from underwriter analysts, on average, outperform those from
non-underwriter analysts. We analyze initiated buy recommendations up to
one year after the IPO date of 148 Scandinavian IPOs performed during the
period 1996-2001, distinguishing between underwriter- and non-underwriter an-
alyst recommendations.6 Our contribution to the existing literature will be
on how underwriter-analyst recommendations should be viewed on other small
stock markets and for more recent data.
Our results strongly support the ’superior information’ hypothesis. Post-
recommendation excess returns reveal that underwriter-analyst recommenda-
tions substantially outperformed the market and, more importantly, they signifi-
cantly outperformed non-underwriter analyst recommendations. Both underwriter-
and non-underwriter analysts tended to give buy recommendations to firms
that had performed relatively well in the recent past; i.e. underwriters did
not attempt to boost previously low-performing IPOs in the aftermarket trad-
ing. Also, in line with earlier research, the market responded equally to the
information conveyed in underwriter- and non-underwriter analyst recommen-
dations during the days surrounding the recommendation date. Controlling for
selection bias as well as numerous other factors, underwriter-analyst recom-
mendations outperform non-underwriter recommendations by an impressive 28
percent during the one-year post-recommendation period.
Although recommendations from underwriters generally occurred earlier af-
ter an IPO than did those from non-underwriters, the absence of a quiet-period
regulation on these markets did not seem to be a problem. Dividing recommen-
dations into those from lead managers and non-lead managers, yielded similar
results; hence the results cannot be explained by either how the markets were
regulated or how the recommendations were grouped. We instead argue that:
(1) lower competition for winning corporate-finance deals in Scandinavia com-
pared to the U.S.; and (2) an increased analyst coverage over time, may explain
our results. First, in our sample period, only one IPO were underwritten solely
by non-local advisors. Therefore, at least one of the members in the syndi-
cate will be a Scandinavian investment bank, logical considering their relative
advantage to foreign peers in knowledge of local regulations and in its future
coverage ability of the company. Consequently, Scandinavian investment banks
compete with each other over the same deals. Second, with several other rec-
ommendations out on the same stock - some perhaps with a negative view -
They analyze the market reaction to initiations, reiterations, upgrades and downgrades for
U.S. IPOs during the period 1999-2000 and do not study the post-recommendation returns to
these recommendations, the main feature of this paper.
6One feature of these stock markets in relation to the U.S. ones is the absence of a quiet-
period regulation. The ’quiet period’, applied only to the U.S stock markets, is a period during
which, among others, lead- and co-managers are prohibited from: (1) issuance of forecasts,
projections, or predictions relating but not limited to revenues, income, or earnings per share;
and (2) publishing opinions concerning values. Until July 2002 it was 25 calendar days, but
was then extended to 40 days. The quiet period was put into place to enable the market
participants to ”correctly” price the stock during an aftermarket trading period, without
biased recommendations.
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underwriter analysts may be less tempted to publish positively biased buy rec-
ommendations. The costs of being discovered with such a recommendation is
simply too high. This is in line with the findings in Bradley et al. (2006) who
argue that market practices (and incentives to analysts) have changed during
the last decade leading to less bullish analysts.
Our main conclusion therefore is that underwriter-analyst recommendations
on more recent IPO firms in less competitive markets can be expected to be
more valuable and less tainted by positive bias.
Section 2 presents the approach chosen, while Section 3 describes the data.
The results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 discusses the possible
reasons to the found results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Hypothesis and Method
The conflicts-of-interest phenomenon has always existed on the financial mar-
kets scene and nothing points against its future existence. One example would
be when an underwriter posts a positively biased recommendation in a recent
IPO-firm where it participated, as was shown in M&W. That there have been
positively biased and directly misleading recommendations from underwriter
analysts was confirmed in the 2003 global research USD 870 million settlement
between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and ten investment
banks and two individuals.7
During the due-diligence process underwriters gain access to unaccessible
information for those outside the underwriting syndicate and are thereby more
informed (e.g., Leland and Pyle (1977)). Banks lending to that firm at the
same time as being an underwriter to that firm’s securities have an even greater
informational advantage (e.g., Puri (1999)). Such advantage is expected to be
even larger on the Scandinavian stock markets since companies in Denmark
and Sweden present less timely or less value-relevant accounting earnings than
U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) earnings (see Alford et al.
(1993)). Therefore, it is potentially more difficult to non-underwriter analysts to
make correct valuations of the IPO firm. The assumed informational advantage
for underwriter analysts over non-underwriter analysts leads to the hypothesis
we intend to test:
Hypothesis: Buy recommendations from underwriter analysts will, on aver-
age, outperform those from non-underwriter analysts.
The method we employ to calculate the excess returns an investor would
get from following the recommendations by underwriter and non-underwriter
analysts is the buy-and-hold approach. We deploy an industry-adjusted buy-
and-hold strategy defined as the buy-and-hold return on the stock minus the
buy-and-hold return on the relevant sector index:8
7See http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18438.htm accessed on March 28, 2006,
where the SEC litigation release #18438 is detailed
8Here we assume that the sector index correctly adjusts for the risk level in the recom-
mendations. A alternative way would be to use a matching firm as a benchmark for each
recommended IPO firm. Considering the relatively small sample size and that there would be
few stocks to match with, we avoid this approach since results would be too sensitive to the
return on the matching firm.
4
ERia to b =
[∏
(1 + rit)−
∏
(1 + rindustry(C)t )
]
, (1)
where rit is the raw return on stock i on day t, and r
industry(C)
t is the return on
the corresponding sector index for that country on that day; ERia to b is thus
the excess return on stock i from time a to b. We define the event period as the
day prior to, the day of, and the day after the recommendation, so that (a to b)
means (−1,+1). Excess returns were also calculated for 3, 6, and 12 months
after the recommendation, one month being defined as 21 trading days.
The excess returns (ERi) for portfolios of underwriter- and non-underwriter-
recommended stocks were averaged for each period according to
PERa to b =
1
n
(
n∑
i=1
ERia to b
)
, (2)
where n is the number of stocks with returns in the period of interest. The
t-statistics were calculated using the cross-sectional variance of excess returns
in the relevant period.
3 Data, Sample Selection, and Descriptives
All Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish IPOs during 1996-2001 were identified
using Thomson One Banker-Deals provided by Thomson Financial. This infor-
mation was then double-checked against information supplied from each stock
exchange: Copenhagen- (Denmark); Oslo- (Norway); and Stockholm stock ex-
change (Sweden). For each IPO we collected: the company name; deal value;
offering date; offering price; participating lead managers and co-managers; and
industry classification (sector). Stock returns were collected from the TRUST
database provided by SIX Information Estimates.
We put no restrictions on minimum deal values, but require the company to
be initially listed at the Copenhagen-, Oslo-, or Stockholm stock exchanges.9
Table 1 describes the 148 sample IPOs by country and the first-year initiated
buy recommendations in terms of market capitalization and industry sector.
IPO activity averaged about 25 IPOs per year, peaking in 1997 (38) and
again in 2000 (43), before falling to only 13 in 2001 after the dot-com crash.
About 50 percent (73) of the sample IPO firms were Swedish.
The Scandinavian stock markets have a few large-cap stocks and many small-
caps. Thus 62 percent (92) of the IPOs were for firms with market capitalization
less than USD 50 million (Panel A). Eight companies (5 percent) had market
capitalization greater than USD 400 million.10
[Insert table 1 about here]
9M&W excluded IPOs with a deal value less than $5 million. If we used an even tougher
restriction such as excluding IPOs with a deal value less than USD 10 million, 27 IPO firms
would have been excluded, but only 6 of the sample recommendations would have been lost.
10The eight companies are: Fred Olsen Energy (453); Saab-Scania (497); Eniro (649);
Tele1Europe (891); Telenor (1,608); Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap (2,966); Scania (3,026);
and Telia (9,267), all in USD million.
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The IPO firms were well distributed over industry sectors (Panel B), with rep-
resentation in almost all industries, classified according to the Global Industry
Classification Standard.11 The largest block of sample IPOs (56, 38 percent)
were information-technology stocks. Information about analysts’ recommenda-
tions of IPO-firms, obtained from First Call, included: (1) the recommendation
date; (2) name of the recommended company; (3) broker ID; (4) analyst’s name;
and (5) text of the recommendation itself. In the database, all recommenda-
tions are standardized using Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S)
recommendation-codes, which indicate ’strong buy’, ’buy’, ’hold’, ’underper-
form’, and ’sell’. We only include initial buy recommendations up to one year
after the IPO date. We thereby obtain a recommendation sample free from news
announcements which would have been the case if revisions from one category
to another would have been included as is done in many other studies (e.g. in
M&W). A certain analyst recommending a firm will therefore appear only once,
reducing the problem with overlapping returns to an absolute minimum.
During the 1996-2002 period that we analyze, there are 469 recommendations
related to the 148 Scandinavian IPO firms in the First Call database within
one year of their offering dates. From the whole sample of recommendations
on IPO firms one year after the IPO date, 28 were ’sell’ (6.3 percent). Not
surprisingly, only one of those were given by an underwriter (a co-manager).
Also, there were and 47 recommendations to ’underperform’ (10.6 percent), and
125 ’hold’ (28.3 percent). In two instances, recommendations were published
before the IPO date, one by an underwriter. The 242 initial brokerage-analyst
buy recommendations (54.8 percent) are differentiated by source (underwriter
or non-underwriter), according to market capitalization (Table 1, Panel A),
industry sector of the IPO firm (Table 1, Panel B), and length of time after the
IPO (Table 2, Panel C).
Underwriters tended to give buy recommendations to stocks with relatively
low market capitalization (Table 1, Panel A), whereas non-underwriters tended
to recommend larger stocks, though the difference is statistically insignificant.
Recommendations were well dispersed over industries (Table 1, Panel B),
with representation in all IPO-firm industries. Not surprisingly, larger IPO
firms tended to be more frequently given an initiated buy recommendation dur-
ing its first year than smaller ones.
[Insert table 2 about here]
Table 2 displays how often brokerage analysts initiated or changed opinion
in the 148 Scandinavian IPO firms during the first year after the IPO date.
Fifty firms had no recommendations (irrespective of whether being a ’buy’ or
a ’sell’) during the first year after the IPO date (Panel A). The remaining 98
IPO firms are categorized in four ways: (1) IPO firms that only received buy
recommendations from underwriters, 31 firms; (2) IPO firms that only received
buy recommendations from non-underwriters, 20 firms; (3) IPO firms that re-
ceived buy recommendations from both underwriters, and non-underwriters, 37
firms; and (4) IPO firms that only received non-buy (e.g., hold, underperform,
and sell) recommendations, 10 firms.
11Global Industry Classification System was jointly developed by Morgan Stanley Capital
International and Standard & Poors.
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For 33 of the 88 IPO firms that received a buy recommendation during its
first year, or roughly 40 percent, only one recommendation was given. More
than 10 initial buy recommendations was given to one IPO firm only, i.e. the
Norwegian telecommunication-services company Telenor, receiving 12.
Only in 14 instances (5.8 percent), did an IPO firm receive a buy recommen-
dation within the first month of the IPO date.12 The majority of underwriter
recommendations were given during months 3-6, whereas the majority from
non-underwriters were given during months 7-12 (Panel C).
In line with previous international evidence, there seems to have been sub-
stantial underpricing on the IPO date (13.57 percent mean excess return the
first day, with a t-value of 6.44). Underpricing on Scandinavian IPOs has been
studied for earlier periods in various studies and the level of underpricing for
our sample IPOs are similar to those.13 Over the next two years these IPO
firms yielded a negligible increase in stock prices (5.19 percent, with a t-value of
0.54). Of the 148 IPO firms in the sample, 111 (75 percent) are still individually
active; the 37 other firms where either bought up by, or merged with, another
company, delisted, or went bankrupt.
Among the underwriters involved in the sample IPOs as lead- or co-manager,
the five most active underwriters were Swedish; there were also two American,
one German, one Norwegian, and one Danish underwriter among the top ten.
As one might expect, more active firms tend to be lead manager more often
then co-manager, and vice-versa for less active firms.14
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Market Reactions
Table 3 reports the reaction to initial buy recommendations of recent IPO firms
by underwriter- and non-underwriter analysts before, at the time of, and up to
a year after the recommendation date.
[Insert table 3 about here]
The immediate (3-day) response suggests that markets marginally discounted
the information contained in the recommendations from underwriters (0.07 per-
cent return, t-value: 0.12) relative to non-underwriter recommendations (0.75
percent return, t-value: 1.55).
Recommendations by underwriters came much sooner (47 days, t-value: -
3.48) than did non-underwriter recommendations. This is natural since un-
derwriter analysts should be able to recognize underpriced IPOs earlier than
non-underwriter analysts. We also note that it takes some time after the IPO
12One month after the IPO would mean the quiet period, if such a regulation would have
applied. Two recommendations even occurred before the IPO date itself.
13Danish IPOs during 1984-98 had first-day excess return of 5.4 percent (see Jakobsen and
Sørensen (2001)), compared with 11.7 percent for the Danish IPOs here; Norwegian IPOs
during 1984-96 had 12.5 percent (see Ritter (2003)), compared with 12.7 percent here; and
Swedish IPOs during 1980-98 had 30.5 percent (see Ritter (2003)), compared with 14.8 percent
here.
14We find large variations in the stock-price performance of IPO firms over different under-
writers, and therefore correct for broker affiliation in our results.
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date before the initial buy recommendations are posted (about five months for
underwriters and more than six months for non underwriters). One possible rea-
son may be that when the shares of IPO firms are sold to institutional investors
in U.S. or U.K., underwriters will follow the regulation in those countries as well.
This will certainly ’slow’ down the recommendation process for underwriters.
Nevertheless, since considerable time passes between the IPO date and the ini-
tial buy recommendations, neither underwriter nor non-underwriter analysts
rush to issue recommendations.
4.2 Pre-recommendation Price Performance
The conflict-of-interest hypothesis suggests that underwriters might be tempted
to boost stocks that performed poorly in aftermarket trading by issuing a favor-
able recommendation. If so, we expect a negative pre-recommendation excess
return to underwriter recommendations. During the month prior to the rec-
ommendation, 49 percent of the underwriter-recommended stocks had negative
excess returns (38 percent of the non-underwriter recommendations had nega-
tive excess returns).
Table 3 shows one-month pre-recommendation excess returns. Recommen-
dations by both underwriters and non-underwriters were of stocks that had posi-
tive average excess returns during that month, though, on average, underwriter-
recommended stocks performed less well (2.12 percent, t-value: 0.96) than
did non-underwriter-recommended stocks (3.34 percent, t-value: 2.17). Thus,
the positive pre-recommendation excess return to underwriter recommendations
says that, if anything, underwriters were not trying to boost aftermarket low-
performing IPO-stocks.
4.3 Post-recommendation Price Performance
Excess returns on underwriter- and non-underwriter-recommended stocks 3, 6,
and 12 months after the recommendation date are shown in Table 3. In 3
months, underwriter-recommended stocks had outperformed their sector by 4.72
percentage points (t-value: 1.35), while non-underwriter-recommended stocks
had underperformed by 2.41 percentage points (t-value: -1.15). The 7-percent-
point difference is statistically significant at the 10-percent level. Over the next
9 months, the stocks recommended by underwriters continued to outperform,
whereas those from non-underwriters continued to underperform. So, not only
did the underwriter recommendations outperform their sectors by a substantial
amount (15.79 percent over 12 months), but the non-underwriter recommenda-
tions were significantly outperformed by 23.13 percent (t-value: 2.02).
Out of the total sample of 148 IPOs, 60 never received a buy recommenda-
tion during its first year. One may argue that there is a selection bias in the
firms that underwriters choose to cover and firms for which First Call records
recommendations. That is, First Call may not keep record of all recommen-
dations and, more importantly, underwriters may choose to cover firms which
their clients have most interest in (e.g. firms large enough to be considered
as feasible investment opportunities). If there is such a selection bias in the
firms underwriters chose to cover and give buy recommendations of, it could
potentially explain the obtained results. With this said, we should correct for
the potential selection bias. One way to do this is to use a Heckman (1979)
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selection bias model, previously used by Rajan and Servaes (1997) correcting
for selection biases in I/B/E/S’s choice of analysts.
4.3.1 Correcting for Selection Bias
The first stage is a maximum likelihood probit model that determines when
the dependent variable in the second stage is not missing. In the second stage
the dependent variable is the one-year excess return on recommended firms. In
the first stage we should include variables explaining why certain firms were
given buy recommendations while others were not. Institutional clients to the
brokerage firm are more interested in larger firms leading analysts to focus on
covering them. Since recommendation coverage may therefore depend on the
size of the IPO firm, we include a variable controlling for it in the first stage
(see Rajan and Servaes (1997)). If a firm was covered by one or more analysts
giving earnings estimates during its first IPO year, it should be more likely
to receive a buy recommendation. We therefore introduce a dummy equal to
one if one or more analysts cover the firm, and zero otherwise. Out of the
148 IPOs, 101 (63 percent) is covered by at least one analyst in the first year
after being introduced, and the average is 2.6 analysts per IPO firm. Only
five large IPO firms were followed by more than ten analysts during its first
year: Eniro (followed by 11 analysts); Netcom (12); Telia (14); Telenor (16);
and Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap (20). It is very likely that First Call keeps
record of close to all recommendations given by brokerage firms of the IPO firms,
but it is also very likely that the number of brokerage firms tied to First Call
increases over time. Therefore we also include a set of year-dummies controlling
for coverage increasing over time.
Apart from whether the recommendation was given by an underwriter or
a non-underwriter, we also include the following explanatory variables in the
second stage: a dummy controlling for whether the underwriter had its head-
quarters in the U.S. and are therefore used to follow the quiet period regulation
(Quieti), 27 recommendations; Sizei is the log of market capitalization at the
end of the first trading day; Timei is the number of days between the IPO
date and the recommendation date; Firsti is a dummy taking the value 1 if the
recommendation was the first in that stock since issuance, otherwise 0; and the
Scandinavian IPO market share of the brokerage firm giving the recommenda-
tion (MktSharei).15 Standard errors were again corrected for heteroscedasticity
using the procedure in White (1980).
[Insert table 4 about here]
Table 4 reports the results on the excess return for the first year after the recom-
mendations on the IPO firms. Heckmans lambda (the correction-variable for the
potential selection bias in the first stage, i.e. λ) turns out statistically significant
15Underwriters with higher reputation tend to take on IPOs with less risk, leading to lower
returns (e.g. Carter and Manaster (1990). We use underwriter market share rather than per-
forming a Scandinavian Carter-Manaster ranking as a measure of reputation; these rankings
do not perform as well for small markets (such as the Scandinavian) as for the U.S. IPO mar-
ket. Market share was calculated as the underwriter’s share of the accumulated IPO total on
Scandinavian markets during the period 1996-2001 and was supplied by Thomson Financial.
We also ran a regression controlling for brokerage affiliation. The results were not altered
and are therefore not presented here.
9
at the 5-percent level implying a selection bias in the firms underwriters choose
to cover. Having corrected for this potential bias, underwriter-recommendations
outperform non-underwriter recommendations by 28.03 percent. This figure
should be compared to the parametric result of about 23 percent, i.e. correcting
for the selection bias further strengthen the results.
So far we have seen that the market initially discounted underwriter recom-
mendations somewhat relative to those from non-underwriters, and the stocks
that underwriters recommended had performed relatively worse in the pre-
recommendation period. However, the positive pre-recommendation excess re-
turns on stocks recommended by their underwriter(s) showed no evidence that
underwriters need to boost stock prices. From the higher post-recommendation
excess returns on underwriter recommendations, we see instead that there is
support for the superior-information hypothesis.
One would expect the best-performing stocks to receive the most buy recom-
mendations, and a really good stock to be recommended by both underwriters
and non-underwriters. Sure enough, the highest two-year excess returns were
on stocks that received buy recommendations from both underwriters and non-
underwriters.16 As one would also expect, IPO firms that did not receive any
buy recommendations in the first year after the IPO date had the lowest per-
formance in the short run as well as the longer run; 20 percentage points lower
than those which received recommendations from both groups. It is worth not-
ing that IPO firms being buy-recommended only by underwriters performed in
line with those IPO firms buy-recommended only by non-underwriters.
4.4 Robustness
Several concerns could be raised about the results presented so far.
First, were the IPOs studied a complete set of all the IPOs on Scandina-
vian markets during 1996-2001? As explained earlier, IPOs were first located
via the Thomson One Banker-Deals and were then double-checked against, and
supplemented with, additional information from the respective stock exchange.
Some of the IPOs found in the Thomson One Banker-Deals were never carried
through (although it was indicated as such) and a firm was occasionally indi-
cated as having performed an IPO by the stock exchange while it was in fact a
secondary public offering. The used procedure discovered shortcomings in the
provided data and after being corrected assures a near-to complete set of the
IPOs in these markets for the period.
Second, were all brokerage-analyst recommendations registered on the First
Call database in relation to the IPO firms during the first post-IPO year? It has
been argued by Bradley et al. (2003) that the coverage of recommendations on
First Call is incomplete, especially during earlier years. They have drawn the
line for the ’earlier years’ as being before 1995. Bradley et al. (2003) uses Dow
Jones Publications Library, the IPO Reporter, the website Briefing.com, and
IPO Monitor. None of these report recommendations for Scandinavian stocks.
This problem should, nevertheless, be of less importance since it is argued in
Bradley et al. (2003) that First Call coverage is almost complete at the end of
our period.
Third, were the results found here driven by dividing the recommendations
16We do not display the results here. They will, however, be available upon request.
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into those from underwriter analysts versus those from non-underwriter ana-
lysts? M&W divided their recommendations into those from lead managers and
those from non-lead managers. In order to find out whether it is our division
as such that generates our results, we too divided the sample into lead-manager
and non-lead manager recommendations. The largest difference to earlier re-
sults is that the one-year excess returns (19.46 percent with a t-value of −1.60)
is no longer statistically significant at any conventional level. Nevertheless, the
three-month post recommendation period is large (9.35 percent), and highly sta-
tistically significant. Although the excess-return difference here is statistically
insignificant for the one-year post-recommendation period they, if anything,
point in the same direction as our previous division.
5 Discussion
This section will be devoted to discussing the potential factors explaining why
we find, contradictory to previous research, underwriter-analyst recommenda-
tions to outperform those from non-underwriter analysts. We believe that two
potential factors could explain these results: (1) the competition between banks
to win deals; and (2) the sample period.
While the results found in M&W are quite strong, so is ours. M&W study
the IPOs for the period 1990-1991 while we study the period 1996-2001. Recom-
mendations during the IPO firm’s first year as a listed company are considered
both here and in M&W; they use recommendations for the period 1990-1992
while we use recommendations during the period 1996-2002. Another important
difference is that they include both initiated and revised buy recommendations,
while we only include initiations. We argue that it is more desirable to only
study the initiated buy recommendations if one want to find whether under-
writer analysts have superior information. If they know more about the IPO
firm than non-underwriter analysts their initiated recommendations should also
reveal that.
Level of Competition. Taken together, the U.S. stock markets (such as New
York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ) are the worlds most liquid marketplaces
for trading in stocks. As such, they attract a large number of players of varying
size. The market for banks underwriting IPOs is not an exception. So, not only
does the composition of these markets differ from the Scandinavian ones, but
also the competition between banks for deals differ. The competition between
U.S. investment banks for winning a deal on the U.S. stock markets, at all levels
of deal value, can therefore be expected to be much greater than the competition
between Scandinavian investment banks for deals on the Scandinavian market.
Out of the 148 IPOs in Scandinavia, in 66 of them the sole lead manager
was a Swedish bank. The majority of these IPOs were for really small firms. So
in smaller Scandinavian IPOs, the underwriter(s) is(are) usually Scandinavian-
based, and for larger deal values the largest U.S. or German investment banks
participates as one of the lead managers. Also, industry professionals told us
that all IPOs on any of the Scandinavian exchanges will involve at least one
local player; a valid statement since only one of the IPOs during our period
was underwritten only by non-local investment banks.17 With less competition
17Sparebanken Pluss, introduced on the Oslo stock exchange in 1998, was underwritten by
Lehman Brother and Goldman Sachs.
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between local investment banks for the local stakes, local underwriters are not
forced to the same extent as in U.S. to issue favorable research in order to get
future deals from that firm. The low number of active Scandinavian investment
banks also ensures a relatively low competition between them for the local stakes
in the deals. The underwriter analysts at these banks are thereby expectedly less
optimistic in their recommendations since they are highly likely to win future
deals with the same company. But this should hold both for firms where the
bank has a deal and for firms they have not. If this is the case underwriter
analysts, who are more secure to get future deals from the IPO firm, should
post buy recommendations influenced by the superior information they possess.
Indeed this is what we find.
Dividing the buy recommendations into those from analysts at Scandina-
vian investment banks and those from analysts at non-Scandinavian investment
banks, the following three observations can be made. First, the 72 recommenda-
tions from underwriter analysts employed by a Scandinavian Investment bank
outperformed the 23 recommendations from underwriter analysts employed by
non-Scandinavian investment banks by 32 percent (with a t-value of 1.26). Sec-
ond, the 116 recommendations from non-underwriter analysts at Scandinavian
investment banks outperformed the 32 recommendations from non-underwriter
analysts at non-Scandinavian investment banks by 13 percent (with a t-value
of 0.88). Third, according to theory we should find the most bullish analysts
among those employed by banks less likely to win future deals at a certain
firm, i.e. non-underwriter investment banks. This description fits well both
for analysts from Scandinavian investment banks and from non-Scandinavian
investment banks. When the Scandinavian investment bank is an underwriter
their analysts produce recommendations that outperform those from their ana-
lysts when they are not underwriters (by 28 percent with a t-value of 1.94) and
the same holds for non-Scandinavian investment banks (underwriter analysts
then outperform by 9 percent with a t-value of 0.79).
An important finding in the above is that when the Scandinavian investment
banks is an underwriter, their analysts post recommendations that outperform
their sector indices (by 23 percent) while analysts employed by Scandinavian
banks not being an underwriter post recommendations just marginally under-
perform their sector indices (by 4 percent). So even if they are less likely to win
future stakes in these IPO firms, they do not try to get such deals by posting pos-
itively biased recommendations. We can think of only one reason to this; there
are plenty of deals for everyone, i.e. there is no need to be overoptimistic. The
reason why recommendations from analysts at Scandinavian investment banks
when the bank is an underwriter outperform the recommendations from such
analysts when their employer is not an underwriter, is because of the superior
information that underwriter analysts possess.
Because of the above, we believe underwriters of Scandinavian IPOs to have
less incentives to issue positively biased (misleading) buy recommendations as
could be expected on U.S. IPOs. This phenomenon should also hold on similar
stock markets characterized by low competition between investment banks.
Studied Period. In the beginning of 1990, stock recommendations registered
on the First Call were seldom. Today, recommendations are much more com-
mon. Scandinavian IPO stocks were given an initiated buy recommendation in
approximately 60 percent of the cases, while an initiated or revised buy rec-
ommendation was given to less than 40 percent of the IPOs for the U.S. data.
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For each Scandinavian IPO firm receiving at least one initiated buy recommen-
dation during its first year, it received 2.75 recommendations on average while
it was 1.45 for U.S. IPOs. Also, for U.S. IPOs: (1) one buy recommendation
was more common than two, if at all being given a buy recommendation; (2)
lead managers are proven to more often issuing a buy recommendation than
non-leads; and (3) other recommendations such as ’sell’, ’hold’, etcetera, are
few. With fewer recommendations out on the market, investors have less in-
formation to compare the recommendations with. This may have tempted lead
managers to publish positively biased recommendations because of a low risk
of being discovered. The number of recommendations on U.S. IPOs for more
recent years are probably much higher; mimicking the M&W-paper during the
same years as our sample would most probably change the findings in M&W.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed stock recommendations by underwriter- and
non-underwriter analysts of IPO-stocks on the Scandinavian stock markets dur-
ing 1996-2001. Underwriter recommendations were found to yield substantially
higher mean excess returns for up to a year after it was given in comparison to
non-underwriter recommendations. This is a result directly contradicting previ-
ous research showing that underwriters and non-underwriters do publish equally
performing buy recommendations or that underwriter analysts even publish pos-
itively biased buy recommendations (as is the case in M&W). The information
gained by underwriters in the IPO-process thus appears to be superior to the
information of non-underwriters.
We found no evidence that underwriters tried to ’boost’ poorly performing
IPO-firms during the aftermarket trading by publishing buy recommendations.
Underwriter analysts were, nevertheless, found to publish recommendations on
average almost two months before non-underwriter analysts, again supporting
the superior-information hypothesis; presumably underwriters were earlier able
to recognize mispriced stocks. For both underwriters and non-underwriters it
takes considerable time after the IPO date before initial buy recommendations
are registered. If underwriters were really attempting to influence IPO-stock-
prices in the aftermarket one would expect recommendations to come sooner,
and to perform much worse.
The clear difference from previous research may be explained by differences
between the U.S. and Scandinavian stock markets in the competition for winning
corporate finance deals and due to the relatively larger number of recommen-
dations during our period on IPOs compared to earlier research. There are
very few underwriters active in Scandinavia; the five most active during the
period are all Swedish. The lower competition for the Scandinavian deals leads
to ’healthier’ buy recommendations from underwriter analysts in recent IPOs,
and underwriter analysts at Scandinavian investment banks publish ever health-
ier recommendations. During the period 1990-1991, which is the period M&W
study, recommendations were more uncommon than they were during the pe-
riod we study. With a larger number of recommendations registered it is more
difficult to get away with positively biased recommendations. Therefore, it ap-
pears as underwriter analysts were less tempted during our period to assist low
performing IPOs in the aftermarket trading with favorable recommendations
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than they have been found in previous research during earlier years.
Our results imply that initial IPO-firm buy recommendations of recent IPOs
from underwriter analysts today can be expected to outperform those from
non-underwriter analysts due to the superior information underwriter analysts
possess. The outperformance is expected to be negatively dependent on the
level of competition for winning deals.
To confirm that our findings are valid, future research could focus on the
U.S. market for a more recent period as well as other markets ideally employing
the division of informed versus uninformed analysts used here.
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Table 2: Brokerage analyst recommendations for the period 1996-2002 on Scan-
dinavian IPO firms. Recommendation-information on the 148 IPOs firms in 1996-2001 was
taken from First Call.
Panel A: Number of IPOs by source of recommendations
Number Percent
of IPOs
Buy recommendations by underwriters only 31 20.9
Buy recommendations by non-underwriters only 20 13.5
Buy recommendations by both U and non-U 37 25.0
Non-buy recommendations only (by U or non-U) 10 6.8
No recommendations 50 33.8
All 148 100.0
Panel B: No. of IPOs, by No. of first-year buy recommendations
Number Percent
of IPOs
No buy recommendations in first year 60 33.8
1 recommendation 33 27.0
2 recommendations 23 16.9
3 to 5 recommendations 18 12.8
6 to 10 recommendations 13 8.8
More than 10 recommendations 1 0.7
(The Norwegian telecommunications company
Telenor received 12 recommendations)
All 148 100.0
Panel C: Recommendations by status, and time before, at, and after the IPO date
U non-U Total
During first month after IPO date 2(2) 12(8) 14(6)
During second month after IPO date 12(13) 9(6) 21(9)
During months 3− 6 after IPO date 51(54) 48(33) 99(41)
During months 7− 12 after IPO date 30(31) 78(53) 108(44)
All 95(100) 147(100) 242(100)
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Table 3: Mean excess returns (percent) on Scandinavian IPO-firm recom-
mendations, 1996-2000. The table displays excess returns to Scandinavian IPO-
firm recommendations before, at, and after analyst buy recommendations by under-
writer status and period. Excess returns have been calculated as an industry-adjusted
buy-and-hold excess return, that is: ERia to b =
[∏
(1 + rit)−
∏
(1 + r
industry(C)
t )
]
;
where rit is the raw return on stock i on day t, and r
industry(C)
t is the return on the
corresponding sector index for that country on that day; ERia to b is thus the excess
return on stock i from time a to b. * = significant at the 10-percent level, ** =
significant at the 5-percent level, and *** = significant at the 1-percent level using a
two-tailed t-test.
t-stat of
Total U non-U U vs.
Buy recommendations (N=242) (N=95) (N=147) non-U
Month before event 2.86 2.12 3.34 -0.46
3-day event 0.48 0.07 0.75 -0.91
Days after IPO, mean 177 148 195 -3.48***
Event + 3 months 0.38 4.72 -2.41 1.87*
Event + 6 months 2.11 8.05 -2.70 1.47
Event + 12 months 1.72 15.79 -7.34 2.02**
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Table 4: Excess returns (percent) on Scandinavian IPO-firm recommendations,
1996-2002. The table presents a two-step procedure discussed in Heckman (1979) correcting
for selection bias. Panel A presents the coefficient estimates for the first stage model (a
maximum likelihood probit model) determining when the dependent variable (one-year post-
recommendation excess return) in the second stage (Panel B) is not missing. In the first
stage we include a dummy which is equal to one if one or more analysts cover the firm, and
zero otherwise. The first stage also includes a set of year dummies to control for analyst
coverage increasing over time. The second stage includes a variable controlling for whether
an underwriter or a non-underwriter (Underwriter) gives the recommendation, as well as
the following explanatory variables: a dummy controlling for whether the underwriter had its
headquarters in the U.S. (Quieti); Sizei, the log of market capitalization at the end of the first
trading day; Timei is the number of days between the IPO date and the recommendation date;
Firsti is a dummy taking the value 1 if the recommendation was the first in that stock since
issuance, otherwise 0; and the Scandinavian IPO market share of the brokerage firm giving
the recommendation (MktSharei). Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity using
the procedure in White (1980), and t-stats are reported in the second column. * = significant
at the 10-percent level, ** = significant at the 5-percent level, and *** = significant at the
1-percent level using a two-tailed t-test.
Panel A: First stage estimates, explaining when the dependent variable in the second
stage is not missing (The coefficients on year dummies are not reported).
Variable Coefficient z -value
Log equity size 0.36 2.81***
Analysts covering the IPO firm 0.61 3.59***
Constant -1.86 -3.58***
Number of observations 148
Panel B: Second stage estimates: Dependent variable one-year post-recommendation
excess return
Variable Coefficient t-value
Underwriter 28.03 2.16**
Quiet -15.91 -1.23
Log equity size -4.79 -1.38
Time -0.03 -0.55
First -3.73 -0.33
Market share -1.07 -0.65
λ (Mills ratio) -37.64 -2.13**
Constant 31.38 1.20
Number of observations 240
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